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Abstract—Inter-vehicle communication (IVC) systems disclose
rich location information about vehicles. State-of-the-art security
architectures are aware of the problem and provide privacy
enhancing mechanisms, notably pseudonymous authentication.
However, the granularity and the amount of location information
IVC protocols divulge, enable an adversary that eavesdrops all
traffic throughout an area, to reconstruct long traces of the
whereabouts of the majority of vehicles within the same area.
Our analysis in this paper confirms the existence of this kind of
threat. As a result, it is questionable if strong location privacy is
achievable in IVC systems against a powerful adversary.
I. INTRODUCTION
Inter-vehicle communication (IVC) systems have been ac-
tively researched over the past years. Vehicles that can com-
municate with each other and road-side units (RSUs) enable a
range of applications. For example, applications that provide
warnings on road dangers and traffic jams, or those that offer
comfort enhancements (e.g., automated update of point-of-
interest information to car navigation systems). Many of the
envisioned IVC protocols and applications rely on position
and time information. This requires all vehicles frequently
broadcasting their position, combined with a time stamp of
the message generation, openly to all of its neighbors.
As vehicle transmissions can be eavesdropped by anyone
within radio range, there exists a clear threat: location infor-
mation could be collected and misused [18]. By establishing a
network of RSUs, any public, private, commercial, or criminal
attacker can collect these packets and create detailed location
profiles of vehicles and consequently their drivers. Possession
of such location profiles could easily breach the privacy of
drivers, as there is usually a strong correlation between a
vehicle and its driver; most vehicles are used by only very
few drivers [8].
IVC protocols and applications provide various identifiers of
the vehicle, in particular the vehicular communication equip-
ment. This can be an identifier for a networking protocol or an
identifier for an application. We abstract away implementation
details and consider the basic problem at hand: the correlation
of an identifier ID with a time t and a location l. The (ID, t, l)
tuple is called a location sample, and a location profile is set
of multiple tuples (ID, ti, li) for the same identifier ID, with
i simply the index of sample.
In order to enhance privacy, one could blur the informa-
tion such a profile provides. For example, by decreasing the
accuracy of the data in a location sample, that is, the time
information, t, or the location information, l. Providing inac-
curate location information is also no option, as many VANET
applications require very high location accuracy to determine
the correct position and lane of neighboring vehicles. Location
obfuscation, i.e. the intentional blurring of the own position,
would render such applications useless. Moreover, the attacker
receiving directly messages sent from a vehicle directly can
easily record a time stamp t on its own.
A feasible approach is to hide the ID of the sending vehicle
from eavesdroppers. Nonetheless, most communication and
application protocols require a unique identifier, for example
as source or destination address of packets. The middle-ground
solution for such protocols is to use a pseudonym, PSNYM ,
instead of the ID. Pseudonyms do not contain any identifying
information, e.g., no vehicle identification numbers (VIN),
clearly no driver names, and it simply identifies the vehicular
node. We term a tuple (ti, li) an anonymous position sam-
ple, and a (PSY NM, ti, li) tuple a pseudonymous position
sample.
Still, pseudonymous position samples can be col-
lected and combined into pseudonymous location profiles
(PSNYM, ti, li). An attacker that manages to obtain such
pseudonymous location profiles could relatively easily relate
them to specific vehicles; off-line information, could be ob-
tained via cameras, and profiles could be correlated to specific
areas (e.g., profiles starting/ending on weekday mornings at the
same location would likely reveal home and work addresses
that could then be connected to individuals).
Therefore, the use of a single pseudonym is not enough
to protect privacy. To address this problem, solutions in the
literature propose that each vehicle use multiple pseudonyms,
changing frequently from one pseudonym to another [16]. The
attacker could then only record location profiles, also denoted
in the rest of the paper as tracks, each of them consisting
of tuples of the form (PSNYM x, ti, li) with each PSNYM x
representing one of the pseudonyms used by a node. Use
of changing pseudonyms can be considered the state-of-the-
art in VANET privacy enhancing technologies; such schemes
were designed with the intention to thwart adversaries that
eavesdrop parts of the network.
However, the accurate location and time information IVC
messages contain, and the very frequent transmission of
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messages (typically, for transportation safety, 10 messages
per second) raise an important question. Can pseudonymous
location samples with different pseudonyms be linked to each
other? Or, even further, could anonymous location samples
be linked? If so, lengthy over time tracks of vehicles could
be generated by an adversary. If the adversary covered large
areas and obtained rich sets of location samples, it could then
create extensive location profiles.
In this paper, we investigate this question. We consider
an area where that the adversary can collect IVC messages,
notably pseudonymous location samples. We analyze how
effectively it can create location profiles, that is, essentially, for
low long it can extract tracks for the same vehicle. Utilizing
one approach relating to the problem of multi-target tracking,
in particular Multi-Hypothesis-Tracking (MHT) [20], we find
that linking between samples under different pseudonyms for
the same vehicle can be surprisingly successful under various
system setups. This clearly indicates that the adversary consid-
ered here can indeed significantly weaken the location privacy
of vehicular network users. Moreover, it points out the need
of additional investigations on the location privacy that can
be achieved given the constraints of vehicular communication
systems.
In the rest of the paper, we first review the related work in
Sec. II and outline the system and adversary models (Sec. III).
Then, we describe our tracking approach in Sec. IV and
present the results of our simulation-based study in Sec. V;
these results demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach.
Sec. VI summarizes lessons learned.
II. RELATED WORK
Changing pseudonyms is regarded as one of the best so-
lutions so far to the privacy problem in vehicular commu-
nications. Many approaches have been proposed to address
different aspects in the pseudonym life cycle. [17] proposed
a pseudonym-based security architecture which covers the
management and organizational issues of pseudonyms. It also
introduced a framework on how to change pseudonyms. [4]
devised mechanisms to improve the efficiency and robustness
of pseudonym generation and authentication in VANETs. [19]
suggested to change pseudonyms according to the vehicle
speed. [6] focused on integration and implementation of
pseudonymity support for a realistic VANET communication
stack. [23] found that frequent pseudonym change can have a
negative impact on communication performance. The lack of
an omnipresent infrastructure and loose connectivity in vehic-
ular networks pose challenges on propagating information on
revoked pseudonyms; [13] proposes multiple mechanisms to
revoke misbehaving and faulty nodes.
Although progresses have been made in pseudonym gener-
ation, management, and application, there are few studies on
the effectiveness of pseudonym changes in terms of achieved
privacy levels and how to maximize protection of location pri-
vacy. [12] applies the concept of mix-zones first introduced in
[2] and studies of the effectiveness of changing pseudonyms:
the unobservable by the adversary regions are modeled as mix-
zones, and essentially nodes change pseudonyms when they
traverse such a zone. They find that an adversary can still
successfully track vehicles, if it places receivers at half of the
intersections in the road network. [7] proposed a context-
aware pseudonym change algorithm to improve pseudonym
change effectiveness and identified parameters and potential
tracking algorithms that influence the attacker‘s success rate.
[21], [10] showed that an attacker can use correlation tracking
to link changing pseudonyms by assigning a non-uniform
probability distribution to the target anonymity set and choos-
ing the target with the highest probability.
A more recent work on measuring the effectiveness of
pseudonym systems in vehicular communication systems is
presented in [14], [15]. The authors propose a comprehensive
privacy metric to assess the anonymity level provided by
pseudonym systems. The results of our work presented here
can be used to determine the source-destination trip probability
required for this metric.
[9] related the issue of linking anonymous location samples
to the data association problem in target tracking systems.
Their experiment applies Reid’s algorithm for Multiple Hy-
pothesis Tracking (MHT) [20] to track anonymous Global
Positioning System (GPS) data, generated by a group of stu-
dents in and around a university campus. Anonymous location
samples from three different tracks are used as input to the
MHT algorithm. The tracking results show that despite several
temporary incorrect assignments, most anonymous samples
can be associated with the correct tracks. This demonstrated
that anonymous location samples can be linked by a tracking
algorithm such as MHT to reveal user movements, even though
their experiment was of limited scope. Inspired by [9], we
applied the MHT approach to vehicular networks. We take a
similar approach, applying a multi target tracking algorithm
on anonymous location samples, but in a more complex and
larger scale setting that has different characteristics (VANET
vs. pedestrian).
III. SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODEL
We assume that vehicles participating in the vehicular
network send beacon messages at regular intervals. Those
beacons carry only an identifier and the vehicle’s current
position. To protect from simple location tracking, the vehicles
use pseudonymous identifiers and change their pseudonym
regularly. In the best case for privacy protection, a new
pseudonym is used for each packet sent. We note that we
do not dwell on the details of pseudonym construction and
the exact node identification; e.g., the pseudonyms can be
elliptic curve public keys and whenever there is pseudonym
change there is also a change of node identifiers (e.g., network
addresses) [16]
In terms of the adversary, we assume a passive attacker
with perfect eavesdropping capabilities, i.e. our attacker can
receive all beacon messages sent in the network. One might
object that such an attacker is quite unlikely to occur, as it is
hard to cover a large area with an eavesdropping infrastructure.
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However, this attacker model allows us to determine the effect
of a “perfect attacker” and later serve as a benchmark for
future results for less powerful attacker models.
Moreover, such a global adversary might not be as unlikely
as it initially seems; at least within a given area the adversary
could have complete coverage. One example is a widespread
distribution of micro roadside units deployed during road
construction. Or, advances in the design of smart directional
antenna arrays might allow large coverage areas with only
limited number of adversarial nodes or reliable reception in
harsh conditions (congested medium). Or the attacker could
tap on other wireless infrastructure.
If such infrastructures are used to create large collections of
VANET-related information, notably location and time, such
data could be abused to mount exactly the kind of attacks
we consider here. After having collected a large quantity
of anonymous position samples (PSNYMx, ti, li), such an
attacker would use the MHT algorithm to connect those
samples to anonymous location profiles. As motivated earlier,
connecting such anonymous location profiles to real identifiers
is an easy final step [8].
Our goal is to determine the harm that can be done to
to a driver’s privacy in a vehicular network. We assume the
prevalent model for such systems and security architectures,
and a powerful global adversary. Our intention is to consider
in a sense a worst-case scenario that is not nonetheless very
far from what a motivated, strong adversary could achieve.
A partially present adversary or an adversary that does not
receive all location samples would be clearly weaker, and in
principle any given privacy enhancing scheme would achieve
better protection. On the other hand, here we experiment and
evaluate the tracking abilities of the adversary equipped with a
specific mechanism. Accordingly, additional knowledge could
be available and more advanced techniques could be devised.
All such aspects are parts of future work.
IV. TRACKING APPROACH
A. Multi-Hypothesis Tracking and Kalman filtering
Multiple-target tracking has applications in many areas,
such as aircraft tracking, surveillance, and visual tracking.
Generally speaking, multiple targets are moving in a given
area and their positions are sampled, at random or periodic
intervals. Then, the tracking algorithm associates position
measurements of the targets in order to form appropriate
tracks, that is, a sequence of measurements deemed to belong
to (be related to) the same target. In other words, a track
reveals the target’s movement in space and time. The difficulty
lies in generating correct associations in spite of the noise
and errors that usually accompany position measurements.
This is known, in the target tracking community, as the data
association problem.
Multiple Hypothesis Tracking (MHT) is an established al-
gorithm in the field. It addresses the data association problem,
by generating a set of data association hypotheses each time
a new batch of measurements arrives. Each hypothesis is a
possible association of a measurement with a target. Then,
Fig. 1. An example to illustrate MHT
the probability for each of the hypotheses to be correct are
calculated, and the hypothesis with the highest probability is
chosen as the best solution. MHT relies on Kalman filters [11]
to estimate the state variables of each target. In the case
of tracking vehicles on a two-dimensional plane, the state
variables are the positions and velocities of the targets.
First, we use a simple example to illustrate how the MHT
implementation works. Consider the situation in Fig. 1: in the
left panel a target has a previously determined track of (1, 2).
The MHT uses the Kalman filter to estimate the next position
(3) based on the earlier results. Then, the MHT receives two
measurements, A and B, which can be either associated with
the existing track or be used as the origins of new tracks. In
our case, the MHT generates two hypotheses (illustrated in
the form of a tree at the bottom) to account for the possible
associations.
The two alternatives are annotated with probabilities. As B
is closer to the estimated position (3) than A, the probability of
hypothesis (1, 2, B) is higher than that of (1, 2, A). Therefore,
the analysis suggests that the most likely associations are B =
3 and that A is the first point of a new track. Next, the MHT
uses the Kalman filter again to estimate a new set of positions
for each of the two hypotheses.
The middle panel in the figure shows that the Kalman
filter estimates two new positions (2) and (4) based on the
hypothesis with B = 3 and A = 1. The other alternative
(A = 3 and B = 1 in the first step) is not illustrated. After
the MHT receives two new measurements, C and D, new
hypotheses are generated as branches of the previous ones. At
this point, the measurements C and D can be associated either
with (2) or (4).1 Based on the distance of each measurement
to the estimated position, the MHT calculates the probabilities
for each hypothesis. It is obvious that D is neither close to (4)
nor close to (2), therefore p21 and p22 will be very small. As
a consequence, the hypothesis p11 illustrated in the right panel
is eventually chosen as the most likely one, as it yields the
highest probability when both steps are considered.
Next, we provide a more formal introduction of the MHT
algorithm and the Kalman filter. Interested readers are referred
to the original paper [20] and other literature such as [3]
for detailed descriptions. In its simplest form, the process
1Corresponding to p21 and p22; the alternatives p11 and p12 are not shown.
178
Authorized licensed use limited to: UNIVERSITEIT TWENTE. Downloaded on May 06,2010 at 14:09:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
of the MHT can be divided into three steps. Those steps
run repeatedly for each discrete time step. When receiving
new measurements, the MHT first uses the Kalman filter to
predict the state variables for each target. Second, hypotheses
for each measurement are generated, and their probabilities
are calculated based on the deviation between prediction and
measurement. The hypotheses are used to build a hypothesis
tree. Third, for each new hypothesis, parameters of the Kalman
filters are updated with the new measurements. To prevent a
state explosion, various reduction techniques are applied, as
detailed in Sec. IV-B.
The following equations give an overview of the three steps.
The state of a target x at time k is modeled as a linear equation:
xk = Axk−1 + w (1)
where xk−1 is the state of x in the previous time step, A is
called state transition matrix, and w is the disturbance noise.
The state variables are building a vector of the form:
x =


px
py
vx
vy


where (px, py) and (vx, vy) are x’s position and velocity,
respectively, in an x-y plane. The state variables can be related
to a measurement z as:
zk = Hxk + v (2)
where H is a measurement matrix and v is the measurement
noise. The noises in the above two equations, w and v, are
assumed to be white, with normal distribution with zero means
and covariances Q and R, respectively. The matrices Q, R, A
and H are of the form:
Q =
[
qT 0
0 qT
]
, R =
[
r 0
0 r
]
,
A =


1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

 , H =
[
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
]
where A is used to estimate the state variables and the error
covariance from the previous time-step, k − 1, to the state
at the current step, k, and H is used to relate the state xk
to the measurement zk. These matrices can be adapted over
time if detailed information about movement patterns or the
measurement process is available.
As we are using two-dimensional position information for
our tracking, we chose a generic, time-invariant form for A
and H , which was also proposed in [20]. Q is determined
by T , which is the difference between the time of the actual
prediction and the time of the previous measurement, and
a value q. R is only determined by a value r. These two
parameters had to be set very carefully, as they have a strong
influence on the results of the Kalman filter. The values that
we used for our tracking setup are described in Sec. V-A.
When the algorithm receives a new set of measurements
at time k, it uses the Kalman filter to estimate the state of a
target xk and its error covariance P caused by the disturbance
noise:
xk = Axk−1
P k = APk−1A
T +Q
(3)
where Pk−1 is the error covariance at the previous time-step,
k − 1.
Based on the set of new measurements Zk, the algorithm
generates a set of hypotheses Ωk. Each hypothesis represents
a different assignment of a measurement to a target. To
prevent a combinatorial state explosion, a measurement is
only associated with a target, if the measurement lies within
a certain validation region surrounding the prediction. Other
optimizations are discussed in the next section. Since the mean
and the covariance of the target estimation are x and P , we can
write Eq. (2) as v = zk −Hxk, and calculate the covariance
of v as:
B = HP kH
T +R (4)
A measurement zk lies with an ”η-sigma” validation region if
(zk −Hxk)
TB−1(zk −Hxk) ≤ η
2 (5)
After all hypotheses are generated, the probability of each
hypothesis Ωki is calculated as:
P ki ≡ P (Ω
k
i |Z
k) ≈
M∏
m=1
f(zm) (6)
where M is the cardinality of the measurements set Zk and
f(zm) = N(zk −Hxk, B) (7)
in which N(x, P ) denotes the normal distribution
exp
[
− 1
2
xTP−1x
]
/
√
(2pi)n[P ]. The values of x and B
are the Kalman filter’s estimates before time k, calculated
through equations (3) and (4).
When a hypotheses was chosen, the algorithm updates the
projected estimate of the state variables in the Kalman filter
as:
K = PHTR−1
xk = xk +K(zk −Hxk)
Pk = P − PH
T (HPHT +R)−1HP
(8)
where K is called the Kalman gain. The values of xk and Pk
will be used in the calculation in the next time step k + 1.
B. Optimizations
The number of hypotheses can grow very quickly when
MHT is used. To enhance the tracking speed, we use the so
called zero-scan algorithm. After each time step, the zero-
scan algorithm only follows the hypothesis with the high-
est probability, and discards all other alternatives. Still, all
permutations of new location samples within the validation
region assigned to existing paths have to be considered, and
the corresponding probabilities have to be calculated. The
number of hypotheses to be checked mainly depends on
the density of the nodes in the simulation area. As we are
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simulating an inner city traffic scenario, very high vehicle
densities can occur and therefore large numbers of hypotheses
have to be processed. In order to be able to calculate a
result with limited resources, the hypotheses tree has to be
reduced as much as possible. In traffic scenarios, most of
the combinations are obviously not possible, as the vehicles
are restricted by environment physical limitations. Samples
may not be reachable from the end of a specific path given
specific limitations on acceleration/deceleration or speed of
vehicles are neglected. Before the hypotheses for a sample are
generated, those with a probability below a certain threshold
are discarded. Moreover, paths (tracks) that were not extended
for some time are considered “dead” and they are no longer
taken into account.
We have implemented the described algorithm and we
applied it to data-sets of anonymized position samples created
through various mobility models and traces. The implemen-
tation allows us to track up to 175 vehicles in real time
on a common desktop computer (with a 2 GHz CPU). In
our simulation environment, experiments with more than 175
vehicles result in traffic jams and thus in vehicle density that
rises sharply on some road segments; this increases the delay
and memory needs for tracking. We describe our evaluation
setup and results next.
V. EVALUATION
In order to test the performance of our tracking approach,
we have conducted extensive simulations. Our evaluation setup
includes two steps: first, we use a discrete event simulator
and a vehicular mobility model to generate mobility traces.
Based on these traces, we create sample data containing
the anonymized position samples. In the second step, those
anonymized position samples are processed by our Multi-
Hypothesis Tracker. The tracker’s results are finally compared
to the original traces. As for the evaluation metric we use
the maximum period of time the tracker was able to correctly
reproduce the trace of each vehicle, averaged over all traces
in the simulation.
A. Simulation and Tracking Setup
Due to the lack of real-world data covering hundreds of
vehicles over a long period of time, we depend on traffic
simulations to produce the tracker input. For trace generation
we use the JiST/SWANS ad-hoc network simulator [1] in com-
bination with the STRAW vehicular mobility model [5]. This
combination has been found to simulate vehicular mobility
reasonably well [22].
STRAW simulates vehicle movements in traffic networks
composed of road segments, which are sub-divided into lanes.
Depending on the type of the street, there are traffic lights
and the amount of lanes in each direction and the maximum
speed differs. Vehicles moving on each lane are periodically
calculating the acceleration or deceleration for the next time
step. The calculation considers the free space to the preceding
vehicle within the actual or the next road segment. A vehicle
has to wait at the end of a segment, until there is room on a
Mobility model STRAW (urban/central Boston map)
Number of nodes 25 – 250
Fieldsize 1000 m x 1000 m
Simulation time 1000 seconds
Beacon rate 1 Hz (if not noted otherwise)
Max. node velocity 11− 26 m/s (road dependent)
Max. acceleration 2.23 m/s2
Max. deceleration 11.15 m/s2
Simulation runs 10 (per number of nodes)
TABLE I
OVERVIEW ON SIMULATION PARAMETERS.
lane in the following segment. To smoothen out the vehicle
movement, i.e., to avoid jumps between road segments, an
intersection area is defined in-between road segments. Vehicles
inside the intersection area are moving along Be´zier curves
from one lane end to the starting point of another. There is
no collision recognition implemented, so vehicles crossing an
intersection at the same time may contact each other. Moving
on one road segment, vehicles cannot change lanes, thus
overtaking does not happen. But vehicles can change lanes
when entering a new road segment. On average, this happens
every few seconds, thus they are able to pass slower vehicles
on a neighboring lane.
Among the advantages of this setup are (i) the broad avail-
ability of map data (with the help of a converter, maps of the
TIGER2 format are supported), and (ii) the realistic simulation
of vehicle behavior according to the physical movements
of massive objects with limited acceleration. The fact that
vehicles sometimes drive through each other on intersections
makes it hard for the tracker to find the correct path in
the specific situation, so, keeping a safety distance between
vehicles would further improve tracking results. Table I lists
the most important configuration settings for the generation of
mobility traces. The resultant position data is then fed into the
Multi-Hypothesis Tracker. Our MHT implementation is widely
configurable and contains almost 50 different preference set-
tings. We tracked several thousands of single simulations to
learn about the influence of the different settings on tracking
success. Here we only want to introduce the ones that we
found to be most relevant.
The disturbance and measurement covariances (i.e. Q and
R) of the Kalman filter turned out to be a determining factor
for tracking accuracy. They are determined each by only one
variable (q and r), and we have tested different ranges in
our simulations. As shown in Fig. 2, it is mostly the ratio
of these two values that determines the tracking accuracy. The
tracking success is measured as the average of the duration of
each path that is correctly tracked, and it can be a fraction of
the total simulation duration. We found that if the disturbance
covariance gets too large, one can observe strong oscillations
in Kalman predictions and the results get almost random. If
the measurement covariance gets too large, then there is a
2Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing,
http://www.census.gov/geo/www/tiger/.
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Fig. 2. Effect of Kalman measurement and disturbance covariance on tracking
results.
strong attenuation of predictions and the system gets very
inert. As one can see in the figure, there is a plateau with
good tracking results from the point where parameters with
the right ratio have to be chosen, in order to get good tracking
results. Parameters need only to be adapted if, for example,
the position measurements are very noisy or the behavior of
the nodes becomes very unpredictable. Thus, q and r were
chosen statically for most of the simulations.
Other important parameters govern the behavior of the MHT
itself. In order to have an acceptable runtime performance,
one has to decide where and how to prune the hypothesis
tree. Too aggressive pruning reduces the tracking success,
whereas too lax pruning can increase the runtime by some
magnitudes, rendering tracking impractical. Another important
parameter called false samples is introduced to allow for
false correlations of single position samples to tracks. In our
simulations false samples is always set to 1. This means that
even though a track contains a single wrong position sample,
it is still considered as correctly tracked if it then continues
with the correct samples. This is needed for situations where
position samples of intersecting paths are located closely
together. Then, the tracker is not able to correctly distinguish
which sample belongs to which vehicle. However, as the two
vehicles continue their trip, the tracker is again able to tell
them apart.
B. Tracking Results
In our first evaluation, we want to check what tracking
results can be achieved for different beaconing rates. We
vary the beaconing rate and use a fresh pseudonym for every
message sent, so that the beacon messages are essentially
anonymous. Fig. 3 shows that for high beaconing rates (one
per second and faster) and for a lower number of vehicles the
tracking duration is about 800 seconds and above. This means
that on average any vehicle in the simulation is tracked for 800
seconds out of 1000. At higher vehicle densities, the average
tracking success goes down to about 700 seconds. Manual
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Fig. 3. Effect of IVC beaconing intervals (ranging from 0.1 to 10 seconds)
on tracking results.
analysis of the simulations shows that wrong correlations
occur almost exclusively at intersections, where traces are
crossing each other. One could also observe that the variation
between simulation runs with same parameters increases, as
vehicle density increases. As higher vehicle density leads to a
higher probability of multiple vehicles being at an intersection
at the same time, this also increases the risk for tracking errors
and is the cause for the poorer performance.
For lower beacon rates, of one beacon per 2 seconds and
less, we see that the tracker performs much worse: there is
simply not enough data available to reliably track vehicles
through intersections. Beacon rates could be seen as one
way of ensuring privacy. However, as current field trials and
standardization activities assume a beaconing rate of 1 to 10
Hz, one cannot count on low beaconing rates for privacy
protection.
Up to now, we have assumed that vehicles change their
pseudonyms for every packet. However, current research on
VANET security suggests that vehicles will only have a limited
set of pseudonyms and will have to reuse each of them
for multiple packets (also for practical reasons due to the
IVC protocol functionality and applications) [16]. In Fig. 4,
vehicles are assumed to use a constant beacon rate of 1 Hz,
but to keep their pseudonym identifiers for intervals of up to
10 seconds, i.e. they reuse one pseudoynm for ten successive
packets before changing to another one. In reality, the reuse
periods of time might even be in the magnitude of minutes.
As one can see, pseudonym change intervals of 4 seconds and
above lead to almost 100% tracking success: the vehicles were
tracked consistently during almost the whole simulation time
of 1000 seconds. Pseudonym change intervals are assumed to
be constant, but for short random time offset for each vehicle
to prevent ’synchronization’ effects.
Another effect could be that at least in the initial deployment
phase only a small percentage of vehicles will be equipped
with VANET communication units. Therefore, vehicles send-
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Fig. 4. Effect of pseudonym change interval (1 - 10 seconds) on tracking
results.
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Fig. 5. Impact of equipment penetration rate (10 - 100 %) on tracking results.
ing beacon messages will be separated from other senders by
a large number of unequipped cars. This facilitates the tracker
(the adversary), as the tracks of equipped cars will cross only
rarely. As shown in Fig. 5 low equipment penetration rates,
when only 10 or 20% of vehicles use VANET communication
units, lead to an average tracking duration of more than 900
seconds. Of course, only equipped cars are tracked in such a
scenario.
Finally, we want to analyze how noisy position informa-
tion influences the tracking success. Assuming ordinary GPS
receivers, the positions reported by cars might be off by
several meters. Fig. 6 assumes a scenario where the position
reported in beacon messages includes the exact coordinates
plus a random, normally distributed, value with σ up to 5
meters in a randomly chosen direction. The results show
that even a σ of 1 or 2 meters already reduces the tracking
success of our attacker very effectively. One has to note that
for many envisioned transportation safety applications, such
as intersection collision detection or lane change warning, a
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Fig. 6. Impact of noisy position information (σ in range of 0 - 5 meters) on
tracking results
very high positioning accuracy is required. Therefore vehicles
will very likely be equipped with high-end GPS receivers,
or use other mechanisms known from navigation systems to
enhance location accuracy. To use random noise for modeling
the GPS error is just an approximation. Usually the deviation
between the GPS and the real position does not vary randomly
from beacon to beacon, but is more constant over time. Just
for few situations, for example, due to interference with tall
buildings in city centers, the GPS error may change more
spontaneously. In case of the MHT, only varying deviation
effects the tracking results, as the tracker is working with
distances between locations and not on absolute positions. So
with real data, in most cases the tracker results will not be
severely decreased by location inaccuracy from GPS.
VI. CONCLUSION
To sum up our findings, in a scenario with vehicles sending
beacon messages at 1 Hz and changing their pseudonyms every
10 seconds and having an equipment rate of 20%, an attacker
with the capabilities described in Sec. III can effectively track
vehicles and their drivers with an accuracy of almost 100%
using the approach described in this paper. Lower beacon rates
and spatial noise of a certain level prevent a tracker from
connecting anonymous position samples to a continuous path.
But this would render the majority of transportation safety
applications – based on vehicular communication – useless,
because they require exact position information.
In contrast to results on tracking pedestrians, discussed
in Sec. II, vehicle tracking is significantly more effective.
Vehicles usually move very orderly along streets and mix
only at intersections and this makes the task of the attacker
comparatively easier. For our admittedly strong attacker, we
have shown that our tracking approach can be astonishingly
effective. Of course, pseudonymous approaches for VANETs
were proposed to thwart a partially present adversary. But
our results raise a valid question on the effectiveness of
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pseudonymous (or even anonymous) schemes in VANETs and
the level of achievable location privacy protection.
For future work, we will investigate the effectiveness of
other tracking mechanisms, as well as different attacker
models. In particular, we consider weaker adversaries and
different variants; e.g., attackers that can collect a fraction
of IVC packets, or/and that they are restricted to certain
areas, or/and have other limitations on the quality of infor-
mation they have (e.g., time). Inversely, we will investigate
how enhance data processing methods could possibly lead
to effective tracking even for such lower quality location
data. Another item of future investigations that our results
motivate: enhanced privacy-enhancing mechanisms, as well as
evaluation of various privacy-related metrics. Overall, we hope
these results will contribute and inspire work that leads to a
more precise understanding of and mechanisms for improved
location privacy in VANETs.
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